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We suggest that the randomness of the hoies of measurement basis by Alie and Bob provides
an additional important resoure for quantum ryptography. As a spei appliation, we present a
novel protool for quantum key distribution (QKD) whih enhanes the BB84 sheme by enrypting
the information sent over the lassial hannel during key sifting. We show that, in the limit of long
keys, this proess prevents an eavesdropper from reproduing the sifting proess arried out by the
legitimate users. The inability of the eavesdropper to sift the information gathered by tapping the
quantum hannel redues the amount of information that an eavesdropper an gain on the sifted
key. We further show that the protool proposed is self sustaining, and thus allows the growing of
a seret key.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum ryptography [1℄ was rst desribed by Ben-
nett and Brassard [2℄ in 1984. Their protool, ommonly
alled BB84, is still the most widely used protool for
quantum ryptography today. Its simpliity, its proven
seurity[3℄ and its possibility to be extended to entangled
photons [4, 5, 6, 7, 8℄ has ontributed to its widespread
use.
BB84 desribes a protool for growing a large seret
key between two ommuniating parties starting from a
smaller shared seret. The proessing of the raw data
found in BB84 requires several steps inluding key sift-
ing, error orretion and privay ampliation. In BB84
privay ampliation [9℄ allows to generate a seure key
starting from a key that might be partially known by a
possible eavesdropper. This inrease in seurity omes at
the expense of the nal key length.
The basi idea of the present paper is to exploit a re-
soure whih, though present in all existing protools, has
sofar not been utilized to the full extent. The random-
ness of the basis hoies of both legitimate parties is an
important resoure as it is a sequene of perfet random
numbers. In urrent quantum ryptography protools it
is simply used to hoose the basis for both, preparation
and measurement of quantum states. We suggest that
this sequene an be further exploited. For example it
might be used for the enryption of data transmitted be-
tween the legitimate parties.
As an expliit example of the idea, we present here a
modiation to the BB84 protool that redues the infor-
mation the eavesdropper an obtain on the sifted key. It
seems that this redution sales with the length of the raw
key, whih would imply that the information of an eaves-
dropper on the sifted key an be made arbitrarily small.
Even though a omplete seurity proof is not given, we
suspet that our protool an work at higher quantum bit
error rate (QBER) ompared to privay ampliation at
the same seurity level. This advantage is gained by fur-
ther exploiting the randomness of the measurement basis
hoies, more than has been done in BB84.
THE PROTOCOL
Our protool an be seen as an extension of the BB84
protool in the sense that the prodution of the raw key
is idential to the prodution in the original BB84. This
makes it appliable to both, QKD based on single pho-
tons, as well as entangled state QKD [4℄. In the analysis
of our protool, we start with from the original BB84
sheme. However, our protool an easily be extended to
the ase of entangled qubit quantum ryptography, and
probably many other quantum ryptography systems.
The two legitimate ommuniating parties, alled Alie
and Bob, establish a ommon seret key in the following
way. Alie prepares a state in a two dimensional Hilbert
spae using one of two mutually onjugate basis sets and
sends it to Bob. In eah basis, one basis vetor is at-
tributed to the lassial bit value 0, the other to the bit
value 1. The hoie of the basis used, and the bit value
sent, are both assumed to be ompletely random.
Upon reeption of the state, Bob randomly measures
the state in one of the two bases and stores the result
together with his hoie of basis used. Now both parties
possess a table onsisting of entries for eah state trans-
mitted. This table is alled the raw key. Up to this point,
our protool is idential to the BB84 protool desribed
in [2℄.
One the raw key is produed it is sifted, whih was
done in BB84 by publily announing the measurement
basis on a lassial hannel and keeping only the mea-
surement results where Alie and Bob happened to have
hosen the same basis (see Figure 1a). We have strong
indiations, that this publi announement of the mea-
surement bases reveals more information about the sifted
2key to an eavesdropper than is neessary for establish-
ing a seure key between the two legitimate parties. To
overome this potential weakness of the existing proto-
ols, a modiation of the basis reoniliation proess,
whih does not publily announe the measurement ba-
sis, is neessary. Note that unlike in other protools that
omit a publi basis announement [10℄, here the enoding
and reeiving bases have been hosen randomly for every
transmitted qubit.
Now onsider the following situation: The two legit-
imate ommuniating parties, Alie and Bob, have just
produed a raw key of length n. Thus, Alie possesses
a list ontaining her random preparation basis and the
random value of the qubit transmitted at eah partiular
basis hoie. Likewise Bob possesses a list ontaining his
random measurement basis and the orresponding ran-
dom measurement result for eah qubit reeived. Every
entry in these lists represent a single transmitted qubit
and an be expressed in two bits of lassial information,
one for the basis that has been used (Bi), the other (Ki)
for the prepared bit value or the outome of the mea-
surement. Every entry of the list an thus be written as
(Bp,i,Kp,i) p = Alice,Bob i = 0, 1, . . . , n (1)
with Bp,i and Kp,i being single bit values. Additionally
Alie and Bob share a lassial seret S1...2n. This 2n bit
seret string has to be available to Alie and Bob before
the protool starts. For the further usage it is split into
two parts of equal length SAlice,1...n and SBob,1...n.
The sifting proess now works as follows (see Figure
1b). Alie and Bob eah apply an XOR operation be-
tween their loal list BAlice,i (BBob,i) and SAlice,i (SBob,i)
to produe a message MAlice,i (MBob,i), in other words
Mp,i = Bp,i XOR Sp,i (2)
The two omputed messages (Mp,i) are then exhanged
over a lassial hannel. Upon reeption, Alie and Bob
an deode the message of their ommuniation partner
and regain the original list of bases by applying the in-
verse operation
Bp,i = Mp,i XOR Sp,i (3)
After this deoding step, Alie and Bob both have infor-
mation on both lists of bases BAlice,i and BBob,i. Thus,
they an now remove all entries of their reord where
BAlice,i 6= BBob,i . (4)
The eavesdropper, alled Eve from now on, an not re-
produe this step, beause she does not have the shared
seret Sp,i. This means that even if she has done some
sort of eavesdropping on the quantum hannel, her infor-
mation on the sifted key is less than in the ase of the
original BB84 protool, as she an not orretly sift the
key with ertainty.
One the sifting proess is ompleted, Alie and Bob
share a sifted key, whih usually ontains errors. In or-
der to generate a seure key, whih an in turn be used
for seure transmission of data, this error has to be es-
timated and orreted[11℄. After error estimation and
error orretion, a seure key is generated from the error-
free sifted key. In BB84 this is done by using a lassial
privay ampliation protool, whih washes out the in-
formation a possible eavesdropper ould have obtained
on the key by measurements on the quantum hannel. In
this step the nal key is redued in length depending on
the amount of information an eavesdropper ould possess
of the error orreted sifted key.
We will show that in our ase the enryption of the
lassial hannel during basis reoniliation redues the
amount of information an eavesdropper an get on the
sifted key. Even though we do not have a omplete quan-
titative desription of this redution of information a-
essible to Eve, we suspet that the additional privay
ampliation step might not be required under ertain
onditions. One has to keep in mind, that the preshar-
ing of a seret string does not represent a disadvantage
ompared to BB84, where a shared key is required for
authentiation of the lassial hannel [12℄.
After the seret key has been established between Al-
ie and Bob, the protool starts anew with the trans-
mission and measurement of qubits over the quantum
hannel. During the new run of the protool, the shared
seret (Sp,i) used to enrypt the basis exhange has to be
reused. It is therefore neessary to quantify the amount
of information an eavesdropper an gain about the shared
seret during a single run of the protool. In general the
upper bound for this information gain depends on the
quantum bit error rate (QBER) as we will disuss in the
next setion. To sustain the serey of the shared seret
it is therefore neessary to subsequently refresh the se-
rey of the initial shared seret after every run of the
protool.
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
The protool presented in the last setion redues the
possible knowledge an eavesdropper an obtain on the
sifted key that is established between Alie and Eve. In
this setion we try to quantify this redution of informa-
tion aessible to the eavesdropper. In the limiting ase
of long key length we nd a strong indiation that our
protool has an advantage over the existing ombination
of BB84 and privay ampliation. Considering that we
use a resoure that has not been used to the full extent
in existing protools, namely the randomness of the basis
hoies, it is reasonable that suh an advantage exists.
The seurity analysis is split in two parts. First we an-
3Figure 1: (a) Sketh of the original BB84 sifting method. The bases used to enode and measure the qubits are
transmitted unenrypted over the lassial hannel. Using the list of bases reeived from their respetive
ommuniation partners, they an deide whih qubits were enoded and measured in ompatible bases and
therefore ontribute to the sifted key. (b) Sketh of the protool proposed in this paper. (1) Additionally to the lists
of BB84, Alie and Bob both possess a preshared seret that is split into two parts, SAlice, and SBob. (2) The
information whih basis was used during eah individual measurement is enrypted before it is sent over the lassial
hannel using the shared seret. This is done by applying a logi XOR between the list of bases and a part of the
shared seret. This enryption of the enoding and measurement bases renders it impossible for a third party to
orretly sift measurement results obtained from eavesdropping on the quantum hannel. For the protool to be
seure it is mandatory that Alie and Bob use dierent parts of the shared seret and that for suessive runs of the
protool, the serey of the shared seret has to be ontinuously refreshed.
alyze the amount of information about the shared seret
that an be extrated from a single yle of the protool.
If this amount of information is smaller than the nal
sifted key, then it is possible to grow a longer shared key
with our protool. In the seond part, we analyze the
ase where Eve has no information on the shared seret
and thus has to sift her measurement results without any
knowledge on the basis used by Alie and Bob.
Plaintext Attak
For the seurity of the proposed protool, it is impor-
tant that the shared seret an not be determined by
analysis of the messages MAlice,i and MBob,i and any
resoures that are aessible to an eavesdropper. This
inludes the iphertext (Ci) that is nally sent by Alie
to Bob after a seret key has been established and full
knowledge of the plaintext (Pi) that has been transmit-
ted with this key. These two resoures enable Eve to
gain full knowledge of the key that has been used to send
the message. This an be seen by the fat that, using
the Vernam ipher [13℄, the iphertext is usually reated
from the plaintext by
Ci = Pi XOR K
sifted
i (5)
and thus,
Pi = Ci XOR K
sifted
i . (6)
To simplify the further treatment, we assume that Eve
has full information on the raw key. This an be written
as
BEve,i = BAlice,i or BEve,i = BBob,i (7)
and
BBob,i = BAlice,i =⇒ KEve,i = KAlice,i = KBob,i . (8)
Note that this assumption provides Eve with more in-
formation than she ould obtain with any eavesdropping
sheme. For a detailed seurity analysis one would have
to drop this assumption and introdue a quantum bit er-
ror rate dependent probability for Eve to have orret bit
value for eah position in the raw key. However in our
proof of priniple analysis is sues to assume that Eve
has omplete knowledge of the raw key.
We now assume that the sifted key onsists of exatly
half the number of bits of the raw key, as this is the
ase with the highest probability. In this ase there exist(
n
n
2
)
funtions [15℄ that represent a possible sifting method
4(see Figure 2):
fk : (Kp,1, . . . ,Kp,n) −→ (K
sifted
1 , . . . ,K
sifted
n
2
)
k = 1, . . . ,
(
n
n
2
)
(9)
It is easy to see that knowledge on the sifting funtion
f that was used to reate the sifted key, is equivalent to
knowledge of shared seret Sj that has been used during
basis reoniliation.
Without any knowledge of the raw key, thus in the
ase where Eve does not extrat any information form
the quantum hannel, Eve an gain no information about
the used sifting funtion and therefore about the shared
seret.
Figure 2: There exist
(
n
n
2
)
sifting funtions that map an
n-bit raw key to a n
2
-bit sifted key.
However, if Eve has maximal information on the raw
key as assumed in (7) and (8), she an try out all possi-
ble sifting funtions with her own raw key, and exlude
all funtions fk that do not reprodue the sifted key,
she knows from her plaintext analysis. This redues the
number of possible sifting funtions to
kmax =
(
n
n
2
)
2
n
2
∼ eαn 0 < α < 1 (10)
whih is still exponentially growing with the key length
n.
This redution in the number of sifting funtions an
be written as a gain of information I on the shared seret,
by alulating the dierene in the Shannon entropy with
and without ruling out the sifting funtions that do not
reprodue the nal sifted key:
I = Hapriori −Haposteriori (11)
with
H = −
∑
i
pi log2 pi . (12)
Assuming that all sifting funtions are equally likely,
pi = p ∀pi (13)
this redues to
H = − log2 p (14)
and we get an information gain of
H = log2
(
n
n
2
)
− log2
(
n
n
2
)
2
n
2
=
n
2
(15)
Beause this information gain has been derived for the
ase where the eavesdropper has full information on the
raw key, this represents the upper bound on the informa-
tion an eavesdropper an gain on the shared seret. To
sustain the serey of the shared seret, the legitimate
parties have to use this amount of bits from the gener-
ated sifted key to refresh the shared seret. In our ase
this would leave the legitimate parties not a single bit for
seret ommuniation. However, this derivation is based
on the unrealisti assumption that Eve possesses full in-
formation on the raw key. One an therefore onlude
that the maximal amount of information on the shared
seret in a realisti eavesdropping sheme is less than the
value obtained here. This strongly suggests that it is pos-
sible to use the protool proposed in this paper for seure
quantum key growing.
Again, we would like to stress that the seurity anal-
ysis presented is based on assumption (7), whih gives
the eavesdropper muh more information on the raw key
than is possible for any eavesdropping strategy.
Sifting without Basis Information
In the last setion we showed that even under the as-
sumption that Eve has maximal knowledge on the raw
key and the transmitted plaintext, the produed sifted
key is suiently large to sustain the serey of the
shared seret. We now want to show that the unavail-
ability of the basis information an drastially redue the
probability to obtain the orret sifted key.
Let us now onsider the ase where Eve does a simple
interept and resend eavesdropping strategy [14℄ on all
qubits transmitted from Alie to Bob. If she uses the
same two basis sets as Alie and Bob, the probability for
having a orret nal key bit is 75%, given that she has
full basis information whih is needed to sift her mea-
surement results key. In our protool, this information
is not available to Eve, and thus a qubit interepted in
a ompatible basis does not neessarily lead to a orret
bit in the sifted key. This redution in the probability
to obtain a orret nal key bit redues the information
aessible to Eve (see Figure 3).
The probability that a single bit Ksiftedl of the sifted
key is derived from a spei bit Ki in the raw key an
be written by the binomial distribution
P (Ksiftedl ↔ KEve,i) =
(
i− 1
l− 1
)(
1
2
)i
. (16)
For a large number of l, this distribution an be approxi-
mated by a Gaussian distribution entered at i = 2l and
5Figure 3: Without the omplete basis information, the
eavesdropper is presented with the following situation:
For every bit of the sifted key, there is a ertain
probability that it was derived from a spei bit of the
raw key. With inreasing key length n, more and more
raw key bits ontribute with non-vanishing probability
to the spei sifted key bit. This redues the
probability to ondut a valid sifting proess and
therefore redues the information on the sifted key
aessible to the eavesdropper.
σ =
√
i
2
.
The full width of half-maximum of this distribution
an be seen as the number of basis pairs that ontribute
with a signiant probability to the given sifted key value
Ksiftedl . By inreasing the length n of the raw key, the
information that Eve an extrat from her measurement
results an be in priniple redued arbitrarily.
Authentiation
Until now we did not speify the requirements of the
lassial hannel used in the proposed protool. One of
the important features of the lassial hannel in BB84 is
message authentiation. There, the authentiation of the
lassial hannel is ruial for the seurity of the protool.
Without authentiation, a seletive modiation of the
basis reoniliation proess would allow an eavesdropper
to derease the detetable QBER and thus to hide the
quantum error he introdued during the measurements
on the quantum hannel.
In our protool, this seletive modiation of the basis
reoniliation proess is not possible as the bases are en-
rypted with the shared seret and therefore ompletely
random. The plaintext attak does not work to gain
information on the shared seret, beause the basis ex-
hange takes plae before the transmission of a ipher-
text. However, any modiation to a randomly enrypted
message Mp,i randomly hanges the bases information
Bp,i and an therefore, in average, not lead to a dereased
QBER. This is an indiation, that our protool ould
also work without authentiation of the basis reonili-
ation proess. However, until a proof is found for this
argument we have to assume an authentiated lassial
hannel.
CONCLUSION
We shown that the random basis hoie in quantum
ryptography is an important resoure and an exploited
more than has been done in existing protools. Further-
more we have presented a novel protool for quantum key
growing that makes use more extensively of the inherent
randomness of basis hoies already present in the ase of
the lassial BB84 protool. By enrypting the informa-
tion on the lassial hannel during the sifting proess, it
is possible to arbitrarily redue the mutual information
between a possible eavesdropper and the legitimate par-
ties. This is due to the fat, that the eavesdropper an
not reprodue the sifting proess even in the ase where
he has maximal information on the raw key, and partial
knowledge of the nal seret key. A omplete seurity
proof and omparison with the full BB84 protool inlud-
ing error orretion and privay ampliation has still to
be onstruted. However we suspet that our method has
signiant advantages in ases where the QBER is high
and seure bit rates suer from a heavy derease due to
privay ampliation.
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